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Parallel Lives: Women's Rights and
Lesbian Rights Litigation
Suzanne B. Goldberg*
I love the title of this panel because it gave
me a chance to think about the historical
themes and emerging issues in law related to
women's rights, which of course is a mere endless set of possibilities.
I spent much of the last decade doing lesbian and gay civil rights litigation, and the question that I will focus on today grows out of that
work and is a comparative one or at least a relational one. The question is this: What is the relationship between women's rights litigation as
it has evolved in the last thirty years and lesbian
rights litigation during that same time period?
Are there connections or are there disconnections and what are they?
I am first going to talk about why I am asking the question and then talk about three
points at which there are arguably connections,
but my ultimate, though tentative, conclusion is
that the connections are fairly limited. A further caveat: this is an early work in progress
that will surely benefit from further discussion
today.
I am asking the question in the first place
because as a lesbian and gay rights litigator and
feminist, it continually struck me when I was at
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund where we focused on lesbian and gay rights litigation - that lesbian rights cases are typically
treated as gay rights cases and not women's
rights cases, both by the organizations that do
gay rights or women's rights work and by the
courts. A lesbian presenting a case in court is

typically viewed as bringing a lesbian case, not
as a woman bringing a women's right case. For
purposes of thinking about the relationship between women's rights and lesbian rights work, I
am interested in both specific legal cases and
broader themes and doctrinal developments.
Have they been the same in work for lesbian
rights as for women's right generally, or very
different?
Now, you might think it obvious that, of
course, lesbian rights work is women's rights
work and that the two are actually not just related from the larger standpoint of lesbians are
women but also from the doctrinal or theoretical standpoint. Before I tum to litigation, I
want to be theoretical for a moment regarding
our comparative inquiry. For many years women of color have pointed out that much of
what is in feminist legal theory deals marginally,
if at all, with the relationship between women's
rights and race. Even today, articles addressing
feminist legal theories will often include a footnote that cites two major articles critiquing feminist legal theory for the failure to embrace and
treat as integral the way that race shapes the
lives of women. But often too, that footnote
seems to be the stopping point in the effort to
fully integrate the consideration of race in feminist legal theory. While this integration occurs
sometimes, it is not very common.
The body of feminist legal theory often
also attempts to drop a footnote or include a
couple of paragraphs about lesbians before re-
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turning to the "real" subject, which is theorizing
about the relationship between law and the constructs of gender. The footnote is a reminder
that the author has not forgotten that lesbians'
experience in relation to the law is often distinct
from that of heterosexual women. But at the
same time it is a strong, albeit unarticulated
statement fully integrating that lesbian lives will
destabilize the project of feminist theorizing
about gender and the law.
Let me just say right at the outset that I am
speaking in generalities and that exceptions exist to what I am suggesting. However, more importantly, my point is not intended as a criticism
of feminist theory. Instead, I want to question
whether lesbian legal theory really belongs in
feminist legal theory at all. Is it appropriate
that feminist theory simply includes a footnote
or a quick mention of lesbians, but instead goes
on to discuss gender without reference to sexual
orientation - without reference to how gender
is experienced by lesbians? My answer, probably not surprising at this point, is that this approach is partly reasonable and in part unreasonable.
And with that theoretical framework in
mind, I want to turn back to the litigation - but
one more footnote. When I talk about women's
rights work, I am really talking about the kind
of work that is done by organizations like NOW
Legal Defense, that identify themselves as feminist legal organizations, and when I am talking
about gay and lesbian rights work, I am talking
about the kind of work that is done by groups
like Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund - my former employer - that identifies itself as a lesbian and gay rights organization.
And perhaps the fact that one of the other major national public interest organizations has
separate projects to address women's rights and
gay and lesbian rights helps demonstrate my
theses regarding the separateness of lesbian
rights and women's rights work. Obviously, litigation is also taken on by private individuals
and that litigation can be as much impact litigation as the legal litigation of these groups, but
because of time and for simplicity's sake I will
just focus on these organizations.
I want to talk about the relationships between lesbian rights and women's rights litigation in three different ways. First, we will look
at some of the ways in which lesbian rights liti-
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gators and women's rights litigators have made
alliances; then at the question of whether sexual
orientation discrimination is a subset or particular manifestation of sex determination, in which
case lesbian's rights work should or could be
thought of as a type of women's rights work;
and then lastly look briefly at one area in which
lesbian rights work and women's rights work
might conceivably have a close and maybe even
an overlapping relationship - although I think
this presumption turns out not to be true.
So first, the alliances. Lesbian and gay
rights organizations occasionally sign on to amicus briefs in cases filed by NOW Legal Defense
or other women's rights organizations. However, it strikes me that although the alliances
were for our mutual benefit, what lesbians as
lesbians would get out of these lawsuits is actually distinct from what women or girls as women or girls would get out of these lawsuits.
Again, to restate the obvious, lesbians are women so to the redress at issue, a favorable reading would also benefit lesbians. But my question here is whether a victory in any of these
cases actually bears on the lives of lesbian women in the same way as on the lives of other
women.
So for example, Lambda for years has
signed on to amicus briefs challenging restrictions on abortion and other restrictions on women's reproductive freedom. Why? Obviously,
there is political solidarity. Obviously, lesbians
can get pregnant, lesbians seek abortions, lesbians want to access to reproductive services, etc.
But why would these cases actually matter to
lesbians from a legal rights perspective assuming that most lesbians will not be seeking to terminate unwanted pregnancies? The answer
here is less about wanting access to abortions
than about a core shared concern and commitment to ensuring body autonomy. If the state
can deprive a woman from the right to terminate her pregnancy, what argument is left for
challenging a state's restriction on consensual
sexual conduct between adults, such as sodomy
laws that criminalize sexual conduct between
consenting adults?
Likewise, a women's rights group may sign
on to a brief in a case supporting the right of a
gay-straight alliance to meet in a public high
school. Certainly there is a commitment there
in women's rights organizations to the rights of
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lesbian youth. But I think also there is a concern, I assume more fundamentally, that restrictions on gay-straight alliances could also lead to
restrictions on access to other sexuality-related
services for young women. The concern, presumably, is that the line drawn to restrict gay
rights groups can easily be extended to prohibit
all conversations about sexuality in school,
which would be very harmful to women or girls
generally. So in short, while the alliances exist
and are mutually beneficial, there is not necessarily a lot of overlap between women's rights
and lesbian rights. This is not to diminish the
value of alliances, but the point of actual intersection between the rights of women and the
rights of lesbians is not clearly apparent from
these cases in which both groups are working.
The second point of possible overlap is in
the theory that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination. And if the
argument works, then it would seem like distinction between lesbians' rights and women's
rights is really an artificial distinction because it
is all sex discrimination. The argument goes
like this - lesbians are discriminated against because we don't conform to social sexual expectations of what a woman should be sometimes
by appearance, sometimes by demeanor, and
more fundamentally by the choice of partner.
In other words, when lesbians are maltreated, it
is sex discrimination at fault because by having
female partners lesbians are defying social sexual expectations.
Now, this may or may not be a very good
argument from a theoretical perspective, but
from a litigation perspective is has not enjoyed
a great success record. If the argument did prevail, it would certainly be advantageous to lesbians to be able to rely on sex discrimination
protections to challenge anti-lesbian discrimination, especially because there are relatively few
protections against sexual orientation discrimination. But for women generally, the courts
generally (but not always) recognize that sex
role stereotyping is a bad thing; that it is impermissible that treating women differently or
badly because they don't conform to sexual stereotypes constitutes sex discrimination. So it
would be a terrific development for lesbians,
but perhaps not significant at all for women if
this argument was actually won.
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Given my being the moderator and not
wanting to overstep too much my time constraint, let me just jump to the third point which
is a specific area of overlap. Perhaps not surprisingly, it is in the family law arena where lesbians' and women's rights are litigated and appear to overlap. The example I want to offer
you is in the area of custody and visitation. In
making determinations about custody and visitation, courts regularly consider a parent's sexual relationship with a third party. In many
cases, courts will not change custody or visitation unless it is demonstrated that the parent's
relationship is actually harmful to the child.
When the parent has a same-sex relationship,
however, courts are much quicker to presume
harm than in the case of a heterosexual relationship. But the truth is that courts actually invoke pretty similar language when they are assessing whether the parent's relationship with a
third person is harmful.
Consider this characterization by a Virginia
court in 1991, following an order that the
mother should have no overnight guests of the
opposite sex during the child's visitation. The
court commented that exposing children to
their parents living with persons to whom they
are not married has been disfavored, and the
moral climate in which children are to be raised
is an important consideration for the court. In a
1986 ruling in Florida upholding a ban on overnight visitation to the mother based on her cohabitation with a boyfriend, the court specifically noted that courts play an important role in
protecting and preserving the institution of
marriage and the family, and that they are not
powerless to prevent impressionable young children from being thrust into the middle of a cohabitation living arrangement which would tend
to foster the development of a distorted view by
such children of acceptable norms of family life
in our society. And in many cases involving lesbian parents, you hear the same thing. In 1998,
for example, an Indiana court observed that "it
is not puritanical or unreasonable to attempt to
shield a child of a tender age from the sexual
practices, whether those practices are heterosexual or homosexual, such protection is sound
practice designed to foster the child's emotional
well-being." This idea it is widely employed.
So we would think that these restrictions represent direct overlap between lesbian rights
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and women's rights generally. And I do think
that heterosexual women would gain from a
court ruling rejecting concerns about third party
relationships. After all, the argument would go,
if restrictions cannot be imposed on a lesbian
parent without showing harm how could restrictions be imposed on the heterosexual parent
without the same showing?
But the converse is not necessarily true, as
anti-lesbian bias has deep roots regarding expression distinct from non-conforming sexuality
condemnations of relationships between unmarried women and male partners. For example, a much-criticized recent opinion observed
that "homosexualct is and has been considered
abhorrent, immoral, detestable, a crime against
nature, and a violation of the laws of nature and
God, upon which this nation and our laws are
predicated. Such conduct violates both the
criminal and civil laws of this state and is destructive to our basic building blocks of society,
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the family ... it is an inherent evil against which
children should be protected." That is a different level of venom than any you will see in
cases restricting the rights of heterosexual parents. Now that level of venom doesn't appear
explicitly in an awful lot of cases, but it is my
strong sense that it underlies many cases.
So where does this leave us? Just to jump
right into the very end of my conclusion. We
need to consider at least two things regarding
the relationship between lesbian rights and women's rights work. One, I think it is invaluable
to recognize that there are distinctions between
women's rights litigation and lesbians' rights litigation, and these are real. And I think our theoretical and strategic challenged, which can be
addressed during the next anniversary of the
Women's Rights Law Reporter, is how we then
continue the effort to cross and bridge these
theoretical and strategic divides.

